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It would seem that no other artist has succeeded in harnessing his art to social and political 
engagement better than Joseph Beuys. This mainly holds true for Beuys’ performance art (Aktion) 
of the 1960s and 70s that contributed greatly to the institutionalization of performance as a 
legitimate form of artistic expression. Beuys was not the first artist to practice performance: he 
was preceded by artists from the beginning of the 20th century such as Hugo Ball, Filippo Marinetti, 
and Tristan Tzara. However, while these artists viewed performance as an experimental form of 
art that addressed a limited and elitist audience and generated enigmatic meaning, Beuys turned 
performance into a form of art that addressed a much wider audience and generated a much more 
accessible and communicative meaning. 
Beuys’ performance art is also distinguished by its engagement with pedagogy and politics. As 
shown by Cornelia Lauf, Beuys does not differentiate between his teaching and his artistic work, 
often mixing them together in various ways. For example, he includes relics of his teaching practice, 
such as a drawing board, in his performances (Lauf 1992, 16). Similarly, as illustrated by Caroline 
Tisdall, Beuys does not differentiate between an act of performance and a political act. His 
performances practice the politics of disseminated power, and in this way, they continually 
challenge the common notion of democracy, while transporting it to radical democracy (Tisdall 
1998). 
As Beuys’ performance art—which resists fixed definition by constantly oscillating between artistic, 
pedagogic, and political action—has already been widely addressed in academic literature, this 
article does not attempt to contribute to this discussion. Rather, it aims to reflect on Beuys’ art 
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from another perspective, one that is phenomenological rather than socio-political. To this aim, 
the article will forgo reflection on Beuys’ performance art and will instead focus on his sculpture, 
mainly the sculpture Fat Chair, dated 1964, which has a performativity of its own. 
This performativity—so the article wishes to argue—manifests brilliantly the tension between the 
violence of culture and the violence of the primordial Other which culture negates via the 
processes of limitation and economy, thought in their broad sense. Thus it could be argued that 
Beuys’ artistic practice gives a visual manifestation of the aporia of culture and nature in a way that 
is other than that of the theoretical academic discourse. By so doing, it could be further argued 
that Beuys’ art subverts the traditional categorical distinction separating art from philosophy. Just 
as Nietzsche could be viewed as an artist-philosopher, so Beuys could be viewed as a philosopher-
artist. This deconstructive gesture of thought brings to light the hidden affinity between art and 
philosophy, which may also be dealing with the same problematic of the human condition, only 
with different procedures of meaning production.  
Beuys’ Chair 
The rarest works of art are those that seem as if destiny has allotted them the task of summarizing, 
in a single material stroke, a dilemma that occupies culture as a whole. This is precisely the origin 
of their immortality, and such is the artwork of Beuys entitled Fat Chair. The first thing that strikes 
the eye in this work is the binary structure to which its name testifies: a chair on the one hand, and 
a lump of fat placed on top of it on the other. These two elements hold a tension, and the question 
arises as to what precisely is the source of this tension. 
To address this, it is necessary to deepen our inquiry into the two elements that comprise the work. 
First and foremost, we should consider the chair. In some cases, rather than create new objects, 
art appropriates objects from daily life. In so doing, it alienates them and makes them appear 
strange, as if they are being seen for the first time. This is precisely what happens with Beuys’ chair. 
Just as Marcel Duchamp posits a bicycle wheel on a stool, Beuys posits a lump of fat on a chair. In 
our being in the world, we are constantly surrounded by chairs. Chairs are to be found in the public 
sphere—in cars, cafes, streets and parks. Chairs are also to be found in the workplace—the 
manager’s chair, the student’s chair, the clerk’s chair, the patient’s chair and so forth. Chairs are 
also to be found in our homes, usually outnumbering the inhabitants: there is the chair in the 
kitchen, the chair on the terrace, and so forth. As we go from chair to chair during the day—from 
the kitchen chair to the car seat to the work chair—we tend to forget what chairs are for in the first 
place. It is as if Beuys wrests us out of this game of chairs and invites us to ponder the essence of 
the chair for the first time. 
And indeed, following Beuys, a number of questions arise. What are chairs for? Of course, they are 
for sitting on. But what is sitting for? One needs to sit, sometimes desperately, since it can be hard 
to stand up for long periods. Sitting should be viewed as an intermediate solution between lying 
down on a bed, so natural to our bodies, and standing upright, which our bodies can find hard to 
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maintain. This intermediate solution enables us to remain engaged in the world, to write and to 
eat for example, with a significant decrease in the effort it requires. 
In this sense, a chair is a human-made object which 
perhaps defines the human as-such. A chair is a human 
object, since only humans can sit. Only humans can sit, 
since only humans can stand. By way of negation, the chair 
therefore testifies to the uprightness of humans; to the fact 
that, at some time in the course of their history, they began 
to stand on their feet. As such, the chair is deeply 
connected to the ethos of the uprightness of humans, and 
along with this, to their essential difference from other 
animals. Animals do not sit—in the human sense of the 
word—since animals do not stand in the first place. 
According to Bataille, this creates a hierarchy of organs: in 
animals, the head and buttocks are at the same height, 
while in humans, the head is higher than the buttocks, and 
is thus considered to be a more valuable organ. Bataille’s 
aim—most apparent in Story of the Eye—is to deconstruct 
this hierarchy and restore equilibrium in terms of height, 
and so equality, of the head and the buttocks, as is the case 
with animals (Bataille 2013).1 
After this general reflection on the essence of chairs, we now 
turn our attention to Beuys’ chair in particular. The first 
question that arises is why Beuys chooses this particular 
chair. The answer is clear: the chair he chooses is the most 
functional one, aspiring to a zero degree of comfort and 
verging on asceticism. What is immediately striking is the 
chair’s minimalism, intended to avoid any feature that is not 
related to function.   
In passing, it is worth mentioning similarities with Freud’s 
chair. 2  In Freud’s chair, the framework only supports the 
body where it is most needed, along the arms and the back; 
any trace of excessive comfort is absent from the chair, 
giving rise to a skeleton of a chair. The weird design was 
intended to support the rather eccentric sitting position in 
which Freud used to read. The chair generates a distinct 
uncanny feeling in its beholder. Besides being due to its 
weird design, this uncanny feeling most likely arises from the 
resemblance of the backrest feature to the shape of a 
Fig.2: The chair in Freud’s work 
room. Freud Museum, London. 
Fig.1: Joseph Beuys, Fat Chair (1964). 
Fat, wax, barbed wire, wooden chair, 
41.6x94.5 cm. 
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human figure, bringing to mind the anorectic human figure apparent in Giacometti’s sculptures. 
The uncanny feeling probably stems from the fact that, even when no one is sitting on the chair, it 
seems as if someone still occupies it—that is, the backrest itself. 
In the words of Le Corbusier, the chair—whether Beuys’ or Freud’s—is thus turned into a “sitting 
machine,” destined to fulfil its function and nothing more. Comfort is therefore sacrificed for the 
sake of functionality. What is important is that this functionality contributes to the policing of ways 
of sitting on the chair. This policing minimizes the range of sitting postures and positions available 
to the body. In fact, it would appear that this policing is precisely what interests Beuys about this 
chair; that this policing is precisely what justifies his choice; and this choice reveals the violence of 
the chair. Here we come to what could be seen as a paradox: on the one hand the chair is a product 
of culture, symbolizing the difference between the human and the animal; while one the other 
hand, it is a violent object, executing forceful and coercive practices of limitation and regulation on 
the living body. But is this really a paradox? Perhaps culture is violent in its very nature, no less 
than nature itself. Beuys’ chair therefore invites us to reflect on the relation between violence and 
culture, and hence on the nature of violence as such.  
The Violence of the Other (ha-Rav) 
Indeed, what does culture have to do with violence? The usual answer to this question is that 
culture is aimed at reducing violence in order to guarantee coexistence. But as we have seen, this 
product of culture called chair turns out to be a violent machine. How can this be? To answer this, 
we clearly need to further deepen our inquiry into the essence of violence.  
To this aim we must be violent with violence by making a distinction within violence itself. It can be 
argued that the violence of culture, as manifested in the chair, is not the first violence; that it is in 
fact preceded by another violence: the violence of the Other. Following Benjamin, the violence of 
culture—as it is manifested in the chair for example—can be termed secondary violence (Benjamin 
calls this law-preserving violence). This violence is preceded by another violence, the violence of 
the Other, that can be termed primal violence (Benjamin calls this law-making violence) (Benjamin 
1986, 277–300). In the beginning, then, there was violence. 
But what precisely is the nature of this primal violence? Any attempt to define it will miss the mark, 
since the violent nature of this kind of violence is manifested precisely in its fierce resistance to 
definition. This resistance is the origin of its violent nature; it is violence itself. Nevertheless, the 
resistance to definition can provide us with an initial definition by way of negation: primal violence 
is concerned with resistance to any attempt at definition. Definition is the first step towards 
identity, and in this sense, primal violence can be viewed as an all-out war on the first principle of 
philosophy: the principle of identity.  
Primal violence can be viewed as an arch-war, a war at the arche (“origin”). This is a state of war of 
every one against every other; of the one invading the other up to the point where there is no one 
and no other. This involves the blurring of any border or identity, and hence any definition. This is 
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why primal violence can also be termed the violence of difference, when thought in line with 
Derrida (1982, 1–27), or the violence of the Thing when thought in line with Lacan (1992, 43–57). I 
myself wish to call it the violence of ha-Rav.3 
The introduction of this Hebrew neologism can be justified in several ways: Firstly, one should 
always aspire to philosophize in one’s own mother tongue in order to retain in the discourse the 
pre-Oedipal, and hence pre-logical, reverberations of language, i.e., the semiotic, as Kristeva would 
have it. 
Secondly, the Hebrew language in particular, as with the Greek language, can be counted among 
the primordial philosophical languages, in which the fundamental philosophical terms such as 
Being (“Havaya” in Hebrew, which stems from the very same root as the unspoken word “Yehova,” 
i.e., “God”) were first spelled out. This testifies to an inner connection between philosophy and the 
Hebrew language. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, this Hebrew neologism achieves what is practically 
unachievable in other languages, i.e., it captures in a single word both the Thing and its innate 
violence. How is this so? It just happens, by pure chance (or not?), that this Hebrew word—ha-Rav—
carries three distinct yet connected meanings: “manifold” (ribui); “quarrel” or “dispute” (riv); and 
“sovereignty” (ribonut), from which the word Rabbi is derived and with which the English reader is 
perhaps better acquainted. These three meanings incessantly contaminate each other: it could 
therefore be argued that the irreducible manifold of ha-Rav is in constant quarrel and dispute; and 
that this disputed manifold should be viewed as the first sovereign, since all other sovereigns—
whether the super ego or the state—as Freud and Benjamin show us, draw their sovereignty from 
it.  
The violence of the Other (Rav) does not necessarily carry a negative sense, being both beyond 
good and evil, and before there is even any difference between the two. It does not resemble 
human violence since human violence is mostly engaged with intention, and even pleasure. The 
Violence of the Other (Rav) is instead violent in the sense that it devours any gesture on behalf of 
any being, whether object or subject, to constitute an identity of its own. Any gesture of this kind 
immediately crumbles into the beaten being of the Other (Rav), in which there is only room for 
manifold, and not for identity; and which devours anything that wishes to differentiate itself as a 
being from Being or as thing from the Thing. Just as the Other (Rav) is indifferent to the difference 
between good and evil, so it is indifferent to the difference between object and subject. The 
violence of the Other (Rav) could therefore be considered as preobjective and presubjective. 
From the side of the object, so phenomenology teaches us, the violence of the Other (Rav) is 
embodied in excess, prior to any determination. Out of this excessive excess, with the help of 
categorical reductive and formative procedures, the thing called “object” will eventually unfold. 
From the side of the subject, so psychoanalysis teaches us, it is manifested in the bunch of drives 
called “Id,” and from this bunch of drives, with the help of the procedures of repression and denial, 
the thing that calls itself “I” will eventually unfold; it “must” unfold, so Freud teaches. 
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The concept that is not a concept of ha-Rav, therefore, violates the distinction between object and 
subject as it resides on both sides of this difference; it is “outside” as well as “inside.”  
The Violence of the Father 
The discussion of the limitation procedures taking place from the side of the object, as well as from 
the side of the subject, enables us to trace the initial contours of secondary violence. From the side 
of the object, it could be termed violence of the category. As is well known, Kant supposes the 
sensuous giveness (Gegebenheit), that spontaneously comes from outside, to be chaotic, and hence 
un-understandable. The main thrust of his Copernican revolution resides in his claim that the 
constitution of the sensuous giveness (or sensual Rav) into a meaningful world occurs with the help 
of twelve a priori concepts—the categories—whether unity, manifold, cause, substance, and so 
forth. The apprehension of the sensuous Rav through the categories constitutes it into a distinct 
object which Kant designates as “phenomenon.” In this way, the categorical constitution creates an 
understandable world that is subject to the laws of science which stem from the structure of reason 
itself (Kant 2004). But this constitution of a meaningful world is essentially violent since it entails 
the reduction of ha-Rav. The secondary violence of the category could therefore be thought of as 
situated in an opposition to the primal violence of ha-Rav. 
From the side of the subject, we shall refer to the secondary violence as the violence of the Father. 
Of course, this does not refer to the biological father of flesh and blood, but rather, the symbolic 
father in the language of Lacan. According to Lacan’s critique of Freud, the pivotal figure of the 
father should be stripped of its concrete physiological traits and instead be thought in structural 
terms as a function of signification. Lacan’s symbolic father functions first and foremost as an agent 
of the law, an agent that enforces this law coercively and violently on the newly-born subject, and 
ushers her/him into the Symbolic Order. 
However, before the newly-born subject can turn into a speaking-being (parlêtre) and be 
assimilated into the Symbolic Order, she/he must go through a process of figuration and 
identification that is achieved in what Lacan terms “the mirror stage.” By going through this mirror 
stage—in which the reflection of the holistic figure of the body as it appears in the mirror is 
projected onto the chaotic and formless primal self—the subject acquires an ideal and hence 
imaginary identity of her/his own (Lacan 1993, 107–142).  
Ha-Rav, in its subjective context—that unbridled bunch of drives of the primal self, more of an “It” 
than an “I”—discovers in front of the mirror the joy of gazing at the whole and harmonious figure 
of the body. This is the first time, so Lacan’s myth of the mirror stage tells us, that ha-Rav in its 
subjective context encounters identity; that is, something whole, ideal by nature, which is nothing 
other than the figure of the body. From here on, ha-Rav will undergo an idealization process: in 
aspiring to identity, it will peel off its instinctual excess and dress itself in the ideal but imaginary 
figure of the thing called “I.” 
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The imaginary I will then be ushered into language by its trembling symbolic father, as Isaac led by 
Abraham to Mount Moriah. This sacrifice of the first-born, violent in itself, is embodied in the 
Lacanian term the Name of the Father (nom du père). This term connotes, not only the name, but 
also the law, since the name and the law are linguistically affiliated due to the fact that the origin 
of the name of the name (nom) is the name of the law in Greek (nomos). So we are dealing here 
with a double sacrifice: the symbolic father not only enforces on the subject the name in particular 
and language in general, but also the law (Lacan 2006, 67). 
How should this duplicity of the name and the law be understood? By ushering the subject into 
language, the symbolic father enforces the exchange of the lively thing with its ossifying name. This 
is a violent exchange involving the murder of the thing by the word, as Lacan puts it (Lacan 1993, 
174). The name stands, of course, for the signifiers in their entirety, first and foremost linguistic 
signifiers. At the same time, the father also enforces the law forbidding incest which, as shown by 
Kristeva, is the origin of all laws (Kristeva 1982, 90–112). The ban on incest enforces the exchange 
of the first object of desire (the Mother) with secondary objects, and hence the exchange of 
enjoinment (jouissance), i.e., sexuality without restriction, with pleasure (plaisir), i.e., sexuality under 
the restriction of the law. The subject is thus ushered into the unpromised land of the Oedipal 
universe, that penal colony of the castrated, created by the simultaneous harsh reduction of the 
thing (signified) to the word (signifier) and enjoinment (sexuality without restriction) to pleasure 
(sexuality under the law’s restriction).  
These two—the name and the law—are secretly bound together: the violence of the law that 
enforces castration is precisely that which generates the signifier, which brings about the exchange 
of the thing with the name. The name is thus acquired by the sacrifice of the most precious, 
enjoinment; but at the same time, the name is also a gift as it enables language, and hence culture 
as a whole. 
This bond between the name and the law is most apparent in the act of circumcision. This can 
perhaps only be properly articulated in Hebrew, due to the rather surprising fact that the Hebrew 
term for circumcision (Brit Mila) binds together the values of “castration” and “word” by rendering 
them in the same notion (Mila). In this sense, the term literally says “the pact of circumcision/word.” 
This is, then, the essence of the pact: in being circumcized (Mila), that is, in the inscription of the 
law on the body, the subject is given the word (Mila), that is, language and culture as a whole. The 
gift of language is therefore connected to circumcision.4 In other words, circumcision subtracts the 
Thing from the body while giving it the name. The pact of circumcision/word (Brit Mila) ushers the 
subject into what can be termed the Order of Circumcision/Word (Seder ha-Mila). 
The above is further reinforced in Freud’s “Totem and Taboo,” which tells the story of the birth of 
humanity (Freud 1950). Freud posits a paradox: the law forbidding murder is itself won by an act 
of murder. The murder of the primordial father by his sons is precisely that which guarantees the 
ban on murder. In that, it paves the way for the first social contract. The primordial father has an 
infinite amount of violence and enjoinment at his disposal, which he exerts mercilessly on the 
members of his pact: his sons and daughters. The only way to escape his tyranny is to murder him. 
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In the horrific act of murdering their father, the sons constitute the law, so guaranteeing that 
neither of them will possess full ownership over violence and enjoinment, and leaving each of them 
with only a leftover of it. The murder of the father should be thought of as an unwanted necessity, 
since it prevents violence of a more horrific kind—the violence of the first father, the biggest 
assassin of them all.  
It is important to differentiate between two categories of fatherhood: the primordial father, who 
precedes castration and is hence placed outside the Order of Circumcision/Word (Seder ha-Mila); 
and the secondary father, i.e., the Oedipal Father, who is castrated and hence situated within the 
Order of Circumcision/Word (Seder ha-Mila). In this sense, the murder of the primordial father 
belongs to the secondary violence; that is, the violence of the (Oedipal) Father emplaced over 
against primal violence, that of the primordial father. 
This secondary violence—the violence of the (Oedipal) Father—can be recognized as the violence 
of economy in all its various manifestations. In this sense, it should also be considered as the 
violence of identity. The violence of the Father is emplaced over and against the violence of the 
Other (ha-Rav). Between these two kinds of violence, violent strife rages. Despite its injustice and 
wrong doing, the violence of the Father should be considered a necessary one, defending us from 
a more horrific kind of violence. The choice to be made is not between violence and nonviolence, 
but rather between two kinds of violence, the second being the lesser one.  
Beuys’ Fat 
We can now say that the murder of the Thing by the category in Kantian terms, or by the word in 
Lacanian terms, and the murder of the (primordial) father by his sons in Freudian terms, is also 
present in the chair. If the category and the word murder the Thing, so the chair murders the body. 
In its form, the chair embodies the presence of law in space; as such, it serves as the delegate of 
the violence of the Father turned against the living body. The chair, as we have seen above, violently 
denies the body a whole array of postures—such as lounging, stretching, and so on—in which the 
body feels comfortable and at ease. It tears the body away from the comfort of lounging, and it 
deports it to the exile of sitting. 
If the subject of the violence of the chair in general is the living body, the subject of the violence of 
Beuys’ chair is fat. When Beuys loads the lump of fat onto the chair, he confronts it with it’s entirely 
other. The chair is an object of culture, while fat is an object of nature. The chair possesses a stiff 
and ascetic form. Fat, on the other hand, is formless and excessive, and it assumes the form of the 
vessel in which it is contained. The chair is structured, while fat is a-structural.  
Fat should be viewed as surplus energy, extracted from the economy of metabolism and 
accumulated in reserve for future consumption. In this sense, not only does fat slip from structure, 
it also slips from economy in general, and in particular from the economy of life preservation. This 
is why—as already acknowledged by Mark Taylor (Taylor 2012, 16–19)—it is considered to be an 
abject material, repressed and extracted from the economy of the body as well as from the 
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economy of cultural representations. What is fat, then, if not a materialistic embodiment of that 
violent Other (ha-Rav), alien to structure and economy. Against this abject, excessive, and violent 
Other (ha-Rav), the violence of the chair comes forth and enforces form on it. 
As is well known, fat also carries a personal significance for Beuys, stemming from the trauma he 
suffered during World War Two when his Stuka dive bomber was shot down over the Crimea 
Peninsula. Beuys survived the crash and was taken care of by a local Tatarian tribe who applied 
animal fat to his body and wrapped it with felt. This healing procedure preserved his body heat 
and prevented him from freezing to death. After the war, Beuys would turn this story—which was 
never properly verified—into his formative myth as an artist, echoing the myth of Christ: only he 
who has dwelt near death; only he who has lost his life and then been reborn, can create art. The 
creation of meaning must undergo the utter loss of meaning. 
Moreover, only he who has gone through such an experience understands that life is constantly 
under threat and subject to extinction at any moment. This is why Beuys lives in a constant state 
of emergency: at any moment he is ready for catastrophe to befall him, and because of this, he is 
equipped with appropriate means of survival, such as his trademark, the multipocketed vest. The 
experience he has undergone also accords him the privileged status of the shaman, which he 
declares by wearing his hat, also his trademark. In this way, art and life are intermixed: art employs 
living materials, and the artist becomes a walking piece of art. 
This myth gives fat a personal significance on top of those already mentioned. As a material that 
saved his life, fat—along with felt, copper, honey, and gold—turns into a life conducting material 
in Beuys’ sculptural vocabulary, a material that is able to preserve life energy and conduct it to 
wherever it is most needed.  
And indeed, it is most needed: it is not only Beuys that is in a state of emergency, but also the 
society in which he lives. This holds true mainly for the 1960s and 70s in which Beuys was active. 
The mission Beuys undertakes in these years, performed in a sense of unprecedented emergency, 
is that of primarily healing post-war Germany, in which death had become a thriving industry, by 
reconnecting it to the life energies of ha-Rav through life preserving materials, primarily fat.  
This holds true, not only for Germany, but also for society as a whole, especially American society 
as the main force driving capitalism. As his work I Like America and America Likes Me indicates, Beuys 
is also concerned with America. To heal America he recruits the coyote, the wild wolf that used to 
roam its prairies. For him, the coyote is just another embodiment of the vital energies of ha-Rav, 
which, like fat, is employed by him to heal America that has detached itself almost completely from 
Nature by an ever-growing capitalist entrepreneurism. This holds true, not only in the 20th century, 
but also in the 21st century. In early capitalism, the merchandise that emerged from the production 
lines exchanged natural matter. In the late capitalism of our age, the simulacratic representation 
seen on our TVs, computers, and iPhones replaces merchandise itself. This is a state of emergency 
since this age of accelerated capitalism in America, and worldwide, alienates us from being before 
the signifier.  
155 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) 
The Aporia of Fat 
After explicating the significance of the chair and the fat, we can now make sense of Beuys’ work 
as a whole. Beuys brilliantly articulates the aporetic tension between the violence of the Father and 
the violence of the Other (ha-Rav). As we have seen, the chair stands for the violence of the Father, 
while the fat stands for the violence of the Other (ha-Rav).  
Between these two, a pact is made—the pact of the chair and the fat—which could be viewed as a 
material manifestation of the pact of the Order of Circumcision/Word (Seder ha-Mila) mentioned 
earlier. As such, Beuys’ work serves as a materialistic embodiment of the fissure between the 
violence of the Father and the violence of the Other (ha-Rav), and in this way, it articulates the 
aporia occupying culture as a whole. 
But precisely in what way is this aporia articulated in Beuys’ work? To answer this, we must come 
back to the fat. As already mentioned, fat should be considered as a reservoir of excessive energy 
extracted from the life preservation economy of the living body. As such, it should be considered 
as belonging to the violence of the Other (ha-Rav). But what has eluded our attention so far is that 
the real living fat—that which embodies body tissue—is not the fat appearing in Beuys’ work.  
This is for three reasons: firstly, Beuys’ fat is industrialized, having undergone complex production 
procedures. This is precisely what motivated Beuys’ critics, who found it hard to notice the 
difference between his use of fat and the way it is used in the food industry. The amount of fat 
used in the discussed work is nothing compared to that used in another work of Beuys, dated 1977, 
and taking place in the city of Münster. In this work, Beuys filled up an entire underground 
pedestrian passage with animal fat. This was later cast into gigantic lumps and displayed under the 
title “Tallow.” This monstrous amount of fat—the monster of Münster—raises the question of 
human’s carnivorous violence against animals. It points to the fact that the Treblinka concentration 
camp is a mundane reality and part of the daily life of animals. This monstrous amount of fat also 
raises other monstrosities from the dead, such as the fat of the exterminated Jews nourishing the 
soil of Auschwitz. 
Secondly, the fat appearing in the work is not shown in its crude, natural state, but is rather 
formalized into a geometrical shape of a triangular prism. It is true that this shape escapes strict 
precision, given the fact that its flanks still reveal the somewhat rough un-linear texture of the fat 
of which it is made. But nevertheless, it is still a form, perhaps the zero-degree of form. 
Thirdly, the fat is torn out of its environment and placed on a chair, which serves as the stage of its 
appearance. Not only the chair itself serves as a stage of appearance, but also the museum in 
which the chair is situated, and hence, the entire cultural array which enables the visibility of art. 
The living fat has therefore undergone reduction through three distinct but related procedures: its 
industrialization, its formalization into a triangle, and its appearance on the stage of art. Having 
undergone these three reductions, it could be said—contrary to Taylor’s approach which identifies 
Beuys’ fat as being real fat (Taytlor 2012, 16)—that, in line with Derrida’s spectrology as formulated 
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in his later writings (Derrida 1994, 1–60), Beuys’ fat is therefore not real fat, but rather a specter of 
fat. 
This, then, is the aporia of fat: its significance as an excessive, violent, abject material, pertaining to 
the violence of the Other (ha-Rav), must be lost in advance in order for it to appear in art. Fat “itself,” 
as it is to be found in animal flesh prior to its industrial processing for example, is practically 
meaningless. Fat only comes to acquire its meaning when, having been utterly lost in its formation 
processes, the cultural process enables its appearance in art. The appearance of fat in art is 
therefore conditioned by the loss of its being.  
We are dealing here with an argument of a much greater scale: the noneconomical violence of the 
Other (ha-Rav) can only appear through the economy of the violence of the Father. It should be 
stressed that—drawing mainly on Levinas and Derrida—the notion of economy is employed here 
in its broad sense, as pertaining to any procedure of measuring, numbering, reckoning, calculating, 
and so forth, and hence of limitation and reduction,5 whether it be executed in economy in the 
strict sense or in the fields of culture and society, as well as in those of epistemology and ontology. 
Thus the precultural and presymbolic excess and violence only acquire meaning from within culture, 
that is, within the economy. But in order to appear in culture, it must lose its being. This aporia was 
probably articulated for the first time in the later stages of Heidegger’s thought: the primordial 
meaning of Being can only appear through the misleading interpretations of Being which 
constitute the history of metaphysics. This aporia is further articulated by Derrida in the concept 
that is not a concept of différance.  
This is precisely the place to host the notion of hospitality to which this path of thinking has led us 
so far. The notion of hospitality goes hand in hand with that of the aporia since the aporetic 
manifestation of one element within the other, justice within law for example in Derrida’s case 
(Derrida 1992) or the violence of the Other (i.e., the fat) within the violence of the Father (i.e., the 
chair) in Beuys’ case, is none other than the hospitality of the entirely Other within any given 
economy, be it the economy of law in Derrida’s case, or the economy of culture in Beuys’ case. 
These economies should be viewed as different names for what is termed here the violence of the 
Father. 
This claim enables us to shift the discourse of hospitality originating in Levinas from the social 
sphere to the aesthetic sphere. Levinas situates hospitality within the other human’s face. The 
hospitality at stake is that of the other confronting the self face-to-face. The hospitable self must 
relinquish his desire to kill the other, and in so doing make way for the other to traumatically 
breach the economy of his solipsistic world. For hospitality in this sense Levinas reserves the term 
“Ethics,” which is identified with Justice, and so resists translation into a system of laws , that is, 
what can be termed “morality” (Levinas 1979, 194–211). The entire force of Levinas’ argument rests 
on his insistence on regarding the social sphere—where the encounter with the other takes place—
as the sole sphere in which the event of hospitality takes place. In doing so, he denies art the 
possibility of acting as a sphere of hospitality (Levinas 1987). Contrary to Levinas, what is stated 
here insists on identifying art as a sphere of hospitality of the entirely Other, who is not to be identified 
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with a benevolent God, as in Levinas’ case, but rather, with the violent Rav. This approach to art as 
a sphere of hospitality of the entirely Other could therefore be termed “Aesth-ethics.” That is, art 
as the hospitable event of the coming of the Other. 
As we have seen, Beuys’ chair is a hospitable place, and as such, it can serve as a paradigm for 
Aesth-ethics, that is, of the event of hospitality of art. What is hosted in Beuys’ chair is precisely ha-
Rav, this excessive violence and violent excess in the form of a lump of fat. Just as in the case of the 
prophet Elijah—hosted on an empty chair during the Passover feast—so ha-Rav does not appear 
on Beuys’ chair in itself, in its flesh and blood so to speak, but only as a specter. Ha-Rav does not 
appear in itself since Beuys’ fat is an industrialized fat, a cultivated fat, which has been through a 
long process of production before appearing on the stage of art. The real fat—if such a thing exists 
at all—has been lost in the processes of its production and appearance, that is, in the violence the 
Father. In this sense, the hospitality of art is aporetic. The thing that is not a thing called ha-Rav 
appears and does not appear in art; is present and not-present in it. It presents itself as a ghostly 
guest while departing, leaving behind a trail of that spectral scent preserved for festive events only. 
According to Derrida, the notion of aporia is in fact disseminated into an infinity of aporias since it 
is of its nature never to be one (Derrida 1992, 3–67). To formulate a phrase like this means to do 
wrong to the aporia since the notion of aporia constantly undermines anything that declares itself 
to possess a “nature,” or an “essence,” of its own, anything which is pure and self-identical. This 
failure resides at the core of the traditional philosophical procedure of knowledge production 
which Derrida himself wishes to deconstruct. Precisely herein resides the power of Beuys’ art in 
particular and art in general: its ability to make manifest, in a single material stroke, the aporetic 
tension that constantly escapes traditional philosophical conceptualization.  
It could further be argued that the aporia of the hospitable work of art is also the aporia of the 
hospitable work of art interpretation. As the work of art itself, it labors to capture the uncapturable. 
With its network of signifiers, the work of interpretation labors to capture that elusive thing—the 
Saying of art—which constantly resists formulation and evades discourse. In attempting to say that 
which is fated to remain unsaid—which is probably left unsaid in this article as well—the work of 
interpretation finds itself captured within an infinite hermeneutics.  
From Fat to Ice: The Israeli Condition 
Contrary to the banal conviction, adopted almost blindly by so many without further questioning, 
that philosophy deals with the most abstract and universal, I wish to uphold the contrary view 
according to which philosophy grows out of daily life and the concrete place in which this life is 
enfolded. This view has its roots already in Greek philosophy, as is attested by so many Greek 
philosophical terms originating in daily life. This is the case, for example, with the Greek word ousia, 
which, prior to its appropriation by philosophy, simply meant “household.” This is also the case 
with the Greek word idea, which in its un-philosophical use simply means “the visual aspect of 
things.” 
158 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) 
In this regard, it can be further argued that one cannot philosophize without taking into account 
one’s own personal circumstances stemming from one’s own bedrock of existence. As such, I would 
like to proceed with an analysis of a local work of art, made under the harsh light of the Israeli sun. 
As we shall see, this artwork bears a striking resemblance to Beuys’ Fat Chair. It is further argued 
that this artwork—just as Beuys’—also bears heavy political implications ensuing from the Israeli 
condition, which cannot be ignored. 
The same aporetic hospitality residing in 
Beuys’ Fat Chair could also be found in David 
Brailovsky’s artwork entitled The Ice Keeper. 
While Beuys’ work is comprised of a chair 
holding a lump of fat, Brailovsky’s work is 
comprised of a pair of hands holding a lump 
of ice. As such, the lump of fat is replaced 
with a lump of ice, and the holding capacity 
is transferred from the chair to the hands. 
But despite this exchange and transference, 
the tension between a human element 
(chair/hand) placed below, and a nonhuman 
element (fat/ice) placed above, still exists. 
Although the chair and the hand seem at 
first to be essentially different, even on the verge of opposition—since the chair is adjunct to the 
body while the hand belongs to the body—their juxtaposition reveals a purpose common to them 
both, that of holding: the chair holds the body while the hand holds the object. The hand, so to 
speak, is the chair of the body.  
The chair and the hand also resemble each other in the sense that both host the humanity of 
humans. As mentioned above, the object called chair attests to the ethos of the uprightness of 
humans, distinguishing them from other animals. Following Heidegger, it could be said that the 
hand also attests to the humanity of the human: as part of his effort to embody thought, Heidegger 
locates the humanity of the human in the hands rather than in the mind since the hand is 
envisaged as a phenomenological appearing locus of Being. Since the humanity of humans is 
determined according to their relation to Being, and since the hand serves as an appearing locus 
of Being, the humanity of humans reside in their hands (Heidegger 1982, 117–124). This argument 
can be further reinforced from a linguistic perspective: in German, the word articulating the 
holding capacity of the mind (Begriff) is derived from the verb articulating the holding capacity of 
the hand (greifen). In English, these holding capacities of the mind and the hand are articulated by 
the same word—grasp—which can be used either literally, in the sense of grasping by the hand, or 
metaphorically, in the sense of grasping by the mind. 
The chair and the hand are also similar in the sense that both are given the task of grasping the 
ungraspable: fat and ice. Both materials are flexible, constantly shifting between liquid and solid. 
Fig. 3: David Brailovsky, A still picture from the video 
work The Ice Keeper (2010), 24x37cm. The artist’s 
collection. 
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This is why they both possess a zero degree of form which could evaporate in an instant. This is 
also the reason for their smoothness as well as their violence. As a reservoir of surplus energy, fat 
manifests the violence of devouring. Ice is the manifestation of the violence of the elemental—
water in this case—inflicted on the hand as it tries to take hold of it. The holding of ice can only 
subsist for a few seconds due both to its smooth elusiveness and the frostbite it inflicts on the skin. 
In this way, just like fat, ice can be viewed as material embodiment of the violence of ha-Rav. 
Similarly, just like the fat in Beuys’ work, the ice in Brailovsky’s work does not appear in its crude 
materiality. From the elemental ice of the mountain peaks in Antarctica and Himalaya, only a 
truncated leftover remains, shaped in the form of a plastic funnel that is filled up with tap water 
and placed in the freezer on the evening prior to the shooting of the picture. Like the fat, ice was 
torn out of its natural environment and placed in the hands that serve as the stage of its 
appearance. This is the aporia of ice: its violent nature must be lost in advance in order for it to 
appear in art. It only acquires its meaning as primal violence when its being is lost in its appearance 
in art. Art, then, serves as the “ice keeper,” in which ice “itself” only appears as a trace and a specter, 
as erased appearance, and as domesticated violence. 
The political context of Brailovsky’s ice should not be ignored: the picture discussed is only part of 
a larger video work which bears the same title.6 The hands holding the ice and disappearing in the 
background darkness belong to a Palestinian teenager from Jaffa. The depicted ice does not 
originate in Antarctica or Himalaya, but rather in an ice cart that used to roam the streets of Jaffa. 
This ice cart—around which the video’s narrative is woven—serves as a reminder of the beauty of 
Jaffa before its occupation during the Israeli War of Independence, that is, before it was 
appropriated by Zionism.  
Spectral remains of this bygone world can be found to this day along the Tel Aviv beach, mainly 
near the Hasan Beck mosque. Most of those who visit this place are unaware of the fact that the 
mosque is the sole building that remains of the Manshie neighborhood, which served as the border 
separating Jaffa from Tel Aviv, and of which only tile fragments glittering in the beach sands remain. 
Art, therefore, is the keeper, not only of ice, but also of the politically repressed, of that lost world 
of the city of Jaffa before it was violently erased by the Zionist occupation.  
As suggested above, this is the case, not only of Brailovsky’s ice, but also of Beuys’ fat. Indeed, 
Beuys’ fat serves as a spectral reminder of that monstrous nature which is termed here ha-Rav. 
However, by the same token, it might just as well serve as a spectral reminder for the monstrosities 
of Auschwitz, that is, for the Jews’ body fat that was deposited in huge pits dug out in the fertile 
fields surrounding the death camp.  
In conclusion, as we saw, the ice and the fat are both abject materials; are both aporetic specters 
of ha-Rav. At the same time, they both serve as a trace of a violence directed against the other, be 
it the Jews in Beuys’ case or the Palestinians in Brailovsky’s case. The fat and the ice—as spectral 
bearers of that violence against the other—find themselves opposed one against the other in an 
antithetical fashion. By doing so, they form a kind of an unresolved deadlock—a deadlock of 
violence—within which the Israeli condition resides. 
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1 Towards the end of Story of the Eye, the heroine pulls out one of the priest’s eyeballs, and shoves it into her 
vagina. In so doing, she wishes to equalize the value of the organ of sight (symbolizing reason), with that of the sex 
organ (symbolizing corporeality).  
2 This is to be found in the Freud Museum in London. It was especially designed for Freud as a birthday gift by the 
architect Felix Augenfeld in 1930 at the request of Freud’s daughter, Mathilda. 
3 The syllable “ha” serves as the Hebrew prefix for articulation. 
4 It is true that the phenomenon of circumcision is discussed in the psychoanalytic literature mainly from the 
perspective of the male sex. This can attest to a theoretical lacuna to be found in Freud, who devotes his 
argumentative thrust mainly to male sexuality while neglecting female sexuality. However, in an attempt to 
complement this lacuna, it could be argued that female circumcision practices do exist, and can be found to this 
day in native tribes in Africa, as well as in the Middle-east and Asia. With migration, however, it is now spreading 
to Western countries, and there are instances of it being carried out in Europe and America, even though it is 
illegal there. 
5 The term “economy” is derived from the juxtaposition of two Greek words: oikos, which means “home”, “house”, 
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